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Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime
The orthodoxy regarding the relationship between politicians and military leaders in wartime democracies contends that politicians should declare a military operation's objectives and then step aside and leave the business of war to the military. In this timely and controversial examination of civilian-military relations in wartime democracies, Eliot A. Cohen chips away at this time-honored belief with case studies of statesmen who dared to prod, provoke, and even defy their military officers to great effect.
Using the leadership of Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion to build his argument, Cohen offers compelling proof that, as Clemenceau put it, “War is too important to leave to the generals.” By examining the shared leadership traits of four politicians who triumphed in extraordinarily varied military campaigns, Cohen argues that active statesmen make the best wartime leaders, pushing their military subordinates to succeed where they might have failed if left to their own devices. Thought provoking and soundly argued, Cohen's Supreme Command is essential reading not only for military and political players but also for informed citizens and anyone interested in leadership.
Using the leadership of Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion to build his argument, Cohen offers compelling proof that, as Clemenceau put it, “War is too important to leave to the generals.” By examining the shared leadership traits of four politicians who triumphed in extraordinarily varied military campaigns, Cohen argues that active statesmen make the best wartime leaders, pushing their military subordinates to succeed where they might have failed if left to their own devices. Thought provoking and soundly argued, Cohen's Supreme Command is essential reading not only for military and political players but also for informed citizens and anyone interested in leadership.
320 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2002
106 people are currently reading
1913 people want to read
About the author
Eliot A. Cohen
29 books83 followersI am an academic who has been fortunate in many ways - beginning with my family, but to include teaching at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, the country's leading school of international relations; serving in government, most recently as Counselor of the Department of State from 2007 to 2009; and having the freedom to move from political science, my original discipline, to history.
One friend who looked at the manuscript CONQUERED INTO LIBERTY, wrote to me -- "Aha! A love note!" and in some ways it is that. It deals with almost two centuries of battles along the Great Warpath route from Albany to Montreal, and it does, I hope, show some of my affection for this part of the country. A good part of the fun of writing the book was tramping around all the sites that I describe in it. But its purpose is serious: to show how the American way of war emerged from our conflict with an unlikely opponent: Canada. It tells the story of ten battles and shows how they reveal deeper truths about the American approach to war. The title, in fact, comes from a propaganda pamphlet strewn about Canada before the Americans invaded in 1775: "You have been conquered into liberty..." it began, and that notion is one that is still with us.
But the argument of the book, I believe, should not detract from stories that will appeal to readers. I hope that you will be as fascinated as I am not only by the events, but by characters you knew (George Washington, for example) whom I show in rather different lights than is customary, and even more so by characters you will probably meet here for the first time. A personal favorite: La Corne St. Luc, the incredibly wily French aristocrat who fought the British, sided with them, joined the Americans, rejoined the British and died one of Canada's wealthiest men after several decades of terrorizing the northern frontier. But there are others: enjoy discovering them!
One friend who looked at the manuscript CONQUERED INTO LIBERTY, wrote to me -- "Aha! A love note!" and in some ways it is that. It deals with almost two centuries of battles along the Great Warpath route from Albany to Montreal, and it does, I hope, show some of my affection for this part of the country. A good part of the fun of writing the book was tramping around all the sites that I describe in it. But its purpose is serious: to show how the American way of war emerged from our conflict with an unlikely opponent: Canada. It tells the story of ten battles and shows how they reveal deeper truths about the American approach to war. The title, in fact, comes from a propaganda pamphlet strewn about Canada before the Americans invaded in 1775: "You have been conquered into liberty..." it began, and that notion is one that is still with us.
But the argument of the book, I believe, should not detract from stories that will appeal to readers. I hope that you will be as fascinated as I am not only by the events, but by characters you knew (George Washington, for example) whom I show in rather different lights than is customary, and even more so by characters you will probably meet here for the first time. A personal favorite: La Corne St. Luc, the incredibly wily French aristocrat who fought the British, sided with them, joined the Americans, rejoined the British and died one of Canada's wealthiest men after several decades of terrorizing the northern frontier. But there are others: enjoy discovering them!
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April 19, 2022
A solid study and a key critique of Samuel Huntington's theory of objective control in civil-military relations. SH argued that the civilian authorities should have control over the actions of the military but try to leave most military matters up to the military itself. SH really admired the military for its professionalism, conservatism, and more insular culture, which motivated his belief that the civilians should leave the military alone in designing strategy and operations.
However, Cohen uses case studies of Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben-Gurion to show that civ-mil relations creates the best results when civilian leadership remains actively engaged throughout the entire strategic process. He shows how each of these leaders did this in some way: interrogating or frequently replacing military leaders, demanding clear explanations, critiquing and sometimes overriding military planning, and, most importantly, making sure that political goals continue to shape military strategy in the Clausewitzean sense. This last point is crucial: it is the task of civilians to make sure the use of force conforms to political goals, which means that civilian authorities must stay constantly involved. My favorite example of this is the Great Scud Hunt from the Persian Gulf War. The military thought it was a pointless distraction from the "real fighting" to be sending aircraft after Scud missile launchers that were attacking Israel. However, Bush and Cheney overrode them and continued the hunt because they knew that continued Iraqi attacks might draw the Israelis into the war, which would destroy the entire coalition of Arab states behind the war. This was a classic instance of subordinating military strategy to political goals.
Another great point Cohen made was that civilian leaders must be informed about military affairs as well as able to choose between conflicting military advice. The theory of objective control doesn't accommodate this point either.
The individual chapters about the 4 main leaders are good and they prove the overall point, even if they repeat a lot of info I knew. The chapter on Ben-Gurion was particularly interesting. The book isn't thrilling all the time, but it makes an important point about leadership and strategy.
However, Cohen uses case studies of Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben-Gurion to show that civ-mil relations creates the best results when civilian leadership remains actively engaged throughout the entire strategic process. He shows how each of these leaders did this in some way: interrogating or frequently replacing military leaders, demanding clear explanations, critiquing and sometimes overriding military planning, and, most importantly, making sure that political goals continue to shape military strategy in the Clausewitzean sense. This last point is crucial: it is the task of civilians to make sure the use of force conforms to political goals, which means that civilian authorities must stay constantly involved. My favorite example of this is the Great Scud Hunt from the Persian Gulf War. The military thought it was a pointless distraction from the "real fighting" to be sending aircraft after Scud missile launchers that were attacking Israel. However, Bush and Cheney overrode them and continued the hunt because they knew that continued Iraqi attacks might draw the Israelis into the war, which would destroy the entire coalition of Arab states behind the war. This was a classic instance of subordinating military strategy to political goals.
Another great point Cohen made was that civilian leaders must be informed about military affairs as well as able to choose between conflicting military advice. The theory of objective control doesn't accommodate this point either.
The individual chapters about the 4 main leaders are good and they prove the overall point, even if they repeat a lot of info I knew. The chapter on Ben-Gurion was particularly interesting. The book isn't thrilling all the time, but it makes an important point about leadership and strategy.
March 16, 2008
Eliot Cohen has an impressive background in policy work (OSD) and academia (Naval War College and Harvard). I had high hopes for this book because I thought his experience with the military combined with his academic work would produce a focused and well-grounded work. I was disappointed. I never really bought his argument that political leaders can lead war better than generals. He seemed to cherry pick leaders than fit his mold. I could not believe that someone who works so closely with the military would generalize military leadership in such a stereotypical way.
The article might have made a good article in a foreign affairs journal, but the author seemed to fill out the book with a lot of interesting but not really relevant historical stories and facts. The Lincoln chapter providing nothing that has not been stated numerous times in more detailed and focused work. The Churchill chapter was the best. Cohen obviously has extensively studied Churchill. His sections on how the historical view of Churchill have ebbed and flowed over the years was well done, thought not rally tied to the focus of the book. I learned the most from the Ben-Gurion, since I knew the least about him.
The book may be useful to an undergraduate class studying political leadership or foreign policy, but beyond that the book unfortunately offers little that is new or of great interest.
The article might have made a good article in a foreign affairs journal, but the author seemed to fill out the book with a lot of interesting but not really relevant historical stories and facts. The Lincoln chapter providing nothing that has not been stated numerous times in more detailed and focused work. The Churchill chapter was the best. Cohen obviously has extensively studied Churchill. His sections on how the historical view of Churchill have ebbed and flowed over the years was well done, thought not rally tied to the focus of the book. I learned the most from the Ben-Gurion, since I knew the least about him.
The book may be useful to an undergraduate class studying political leadership or foreign policy, but beyond that the book unfortunately offers little that is new or of great interest.
July 14, 2020
Excellent book that straddles history and civ-mil relations. Only 240 pages and easy to read. Cohen draws upon history, the discussion of strategy (a theory of victory), and previous entries into civ-mil literature.
Cohen makes a strong argument for the role of an engaged civilian head of state participating and informing the role of the military throughout a war - a counter to Huntington "objective control" or the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine.
This is the third consecutive civ-mil book read after Huntington and Janowitz.
Cohen describes the relationship between four war-time leaders - Lincoln, Churchill, Clemenceau, and Ben-Gurion - and their generals.
"Normal Theory" of Civ-Mil Relations
The "normal" theory of civ-mil relations suggests that political leaders should establish clear policy objectives and turn over the warfighting completely to the military establishment. However, Cohen describes four wartime leaders that refused to defer to military judgment in pursuit of policy objectives. The use of state violence in pursuit of policy goals requires constant re-assessment.
The Unequal Dialogue: The successful civilian leaders had a few things in common.
1) They chose to probe military thought processes and challenge assumptions. The probing, while irritating to the generals, spurred them to action.
2) The civilian leaders surrounded themselves with leaders that would dissent. Often, the civilian leader would back down. Many times, the civilian leader made mistakes - however; they generally made correct decisions.
3) The civilian leader was ultimately in control and was willing to relieve generals that did not perform or were unlucky.
Cohen makes a strong argument for the role of an engaged civilian head of state participating and informing the role of the military throughout a war - a counter to Huntington "objective control" or the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine.
This is the third consecutive civ-mil book read after Huntington and Janowitz.
Cohen describes the relationship between four war-time leaders - Lincoln, Churchill, Clemenceau, and Ben-Gurion - and their generals.
"Normal Theory" of Civ-Mil Relations
The "normal" theory of civ-mil relations suggests that political leaders should establish clear policy objectives and turn over the warfighting completely to the military establishment. However, Cohen describes four wartime leaders that refused to defer to military judgment in pursuit of policy objectives. The use of state violence in pursuit of policy goals requires constant re-assessment.
The Unequal Dialogue: The successful civilian leaders had a few things in common.
1) They chose to probe military thought processes and challenge assumptions. The probing, while irritating to the generals, spurred them to action.
2) The civilian leaders surrounded themselves with leaders that would dissent. Often, the civilian leader would back down. Many times, the civilian leader made mistakes - however; they generally made correct decisions.
3) The civilian leader was ultimately in control and was willing to relieve generals that did not perform or were unlucky.
January 31, 2020
I enjoyed the history lesson and agree with the author’s opinion that political leaders must be closely tied in with their military leadership to gain better strategic results. At it’s heart, this book displays the value of invested leadership. Know your place as leader/manager and understand your subordinates’ jobs to the degree that you are able to not only employ them properly, but are able to scrutinize their results and reward or replace them accordingly.
March 20, 2021
Cohen is an incredible writer who manages to capture the essence of four great statesmen and compare their leadership during war in a short but incredibly clear way that sets up his argument against the "normal" theory of civil-military relations. His deep understanding of the issues he discusses comes across as masterfulness and leads to historical comparisons that few of us could make, let alone with such ease. While this book is foundational in the study of civil-military relations, it is also a critical read in leadership.
April 19, 2017
There are methodological problems with what rules can be drawn from extraordinary cases. And perhaps more analysis of what the subordinates did or didn't do would be more informative. It's also almost impossible to take this book out of its own unique context and wonder if it wasn't too motivated by regret over the Persian Gulf War and enthusiasm for the Iraq war when the generals saw it differently.
Despite all of that, it is fertile ground for meditations on command, expertise, and democracy which is an important thing for leaders and followers alike.
Despite all of that, it is fertile ground for meditations on command, expertise, and democracy which is an important thing for leaders and followers alike.
December 6, 2008
Nice as a refutation piece against Huntington, however it still leaves open the question of under what conditions civilian meddling will lead to optimal (or at least non-sub-optimal) outcomes
March 21, 2022
Supreme Command by Eliot A. Cohen is intelligently conceived and engagingly written. The subject is the fraught matter of civilian versus military control of strategy during wartime. Cohen provides four enlightening biographical essays of leaders who handled the conflict successfully: Clemenceau in WWI France, Lincoln in Civil War America, Churchill in WWII Britain, and Ben-Gurion at the birth of Israel. These mini-bios are set between an opening chapter examining the role of the Soldier and the State, based on Samuel Huntington's book of the same title, and three wrap-up chapters exploring the subject in the light of the profiles of the leaders. Cohen's very impressive skills as scholar, writer, and teacher are evident throughout this book.
Cohen notes that Huntington "laid out what he termed a theory of 'objective control,' which holds that the healthiest and most effective form of civilian control of the military is that which maximizes professionalism by isolating soldiers from politics, and giving them as free a hand as possible in military matters." This formulation came to be treated as the "normal theory of civil-military relations." The effect is the civil side decides that war is the option to pursue, and that the military will then take over the process. Then, "to ask too many question, (let alone to give orders) about tactics, particular pieces of hardware, the design of a campaign, measures of success, or to press" personnel decisions is "meddling and interference...inappropriate and downright dangerous."
In the first three profiles Cohen depicts the leaders within this "normal" framework. None of them fit: Clemenceau would visit the front lines weekly, interviewing soldiers and generals, and continually mediate conflicts between his leading generals; Lincoln pressured his supply chief to obtain repeating rifles, selected and fired generals, and set a spy to report on General Grant; Churchill is famous for his seemingly endless stream of "Action This Day" memos to both military and civil staff, like Lincoln, he fired generals, was actively involved with new technology, and helped set dates for campaigns. Ben-Gurion faced a much different situation: he was involved in creating a government for the forthcoming State of Israel, at the same time planning for the development of an armed force to face an expected war with the Arab World. To establish the new State, he hade to deal with the existing armed Jewish groups with different politics, goals, and abilities. Some of them were having shootouts with one another. His civil-military conflicts were different, but still challenging. His technique was heavy handed and abrasive, but he interacted extensively with the many players, in many cases serving as a teacher of both civil and military affairs.
Readers of military science and military history will find much of interest in the three concluding chapters. Cohen gathers views from a number of military historians who question the standard theory. Some question whether military strategy even exists, given the unique situations and unexpected developments that accompany any war. Cohen also discusses more recent American wars, citing how FDR operated during WWII, and LBJ in Vietnam. In the latter case, he states that the president, although he personally picked bombing targets in North Vietnam, didn't ask too many questions, but too few. The only answer seemed to be, more forces in the field. The political factors of the Gulf War and the Bosnia operations are also discussed. These chapters identify a rich array of additional reading, always a good thing, except for expanding the want-to-read list.
Highly recommended for the military history community, but insightful reading for anyone with an interest in the more political question of the interaction between civil government and the military.
Cohen notes that Huntington "laid out what he termed a theory of 'objective control,' which holds that the healthiest and most effective form of civilian control of the military is that which maximizes professionalism by isolating soldiers from politics, and giving them as free a hand as possible in military matters." This formulation came to be treated as the "normal theory of civil-military relations." The effect is the civil side decides that war is the option to pursue, and that the military will then take over the process. Then, "to ask too many question, (let alone to give orders) about tactics, particular pieces of hardware, the design of a campaign, measures of success, or to press" personnel decisions is "meddling and interference...inappropriate and downright dangerous."
In the first three profiles Cohen depicts the leaders within this "normal" framework. None of them fit: Clemenceau would visit the front lines weekly, interviewing soldiers and generals, and continually mediate conflicts between his leading generals; Lincoln pressured his supply chief to obtain repeating rifles, selected and fired generals, and set a spy to report on General Grant; Churchill is famous for his seemingly endless stream of "Action This Day" memos to both military and civil staff, like Lincoln, he fired generals, was actively involved with new technology, and helped set dates for campaigns. Ben-Gurion faced a much different situation: he was involved in creating a government for the forthcoming State of Israel, at the same time planning for the development of an armed force to face an expected war with the Arab World. To establish the new State, he hade to deal with the existing armed Jewish groups with different politics, goals, and abilities. Some of them were having shootouts with one another. His civil-military conflicts were different, but still challenging. His technique was heavy handed and abrasive, but he interacted extensively with the many players, in many cases serving as a teacher of both civil and military affairs.
Readers of military science and military history will find much of interest in the three concluding chapters. Cohen gathers views from a number of military historians who question the standard theory. Some question whether military strategy even exists, given the unique situations and unexpected developments that accompany any war. Cohen also discusses more recent American wars, citing how FDR operated during WWII, and LBJ in Vietnam. In the latter case, he states that the president, although he personally picked bombing targets in North Vietnam, didn't ask too many questions, but too few. The only answer seemed to be, more forces in the field. The political factors of the Gulf War and the Bosnia operations are also discussed. These chapters identify a rich array of additional reading, always a good thing, except for expanding the want-to-read list.
Highly recommended for the military history community, but insightful reading for anyone with an interest in the more political question of the interaction between civil government and the military.
November 15, 2022
This book by Eliot Cohen is a masterful part-history, part-political science work. In it, he takes on the question of what excellent supreme command looks like; in his mind, the supreme commander is always the national leader with political responsibility for prosecuting a war: the President or Prime Minister.
His methodology is old-school, but necessary for such an undertaking. He examines the subject by studying four cases he considers models—in different ways—of a political leader directing his warriors well: the American President Lincoln and his generals, Clemenceau and the French Generals of World War I, Churchill and his generals (and coalition) in World War II, and David Ben-Gurion with his unruly new military in Israel’s war for independence. Though each person and situation was quite different, each was instructive, in the author’s view, of how a political leader should lead in wartime.
Among the many intriguing observations, these three most interested me: He has quite a different take on Lincoln than most Lincoln biographers. The popular notion is an inexperienced and impatient Lincoln trying out general after general until he found one (Grant) who shared his impatience. To Cohen, the situation was quite the opposite: he saw Lincoln as a master politician who understood what was needed politically from the prosecution of the war, and was served by a string of generals who, unable to make that intellectual connection, never did live up to the political requirements of waging war.
He also challenges the common notion, almost a tenet of faith in today’s military—that a political leader should lay out the broad political objectives of the war, then let the professional soldier figure out how to get it done without political interference. He challenges this notion with the idea that many details of a war, sometimes even small details, have significant political calculations and impacts that Presidents and Prime Ministers, not generals, are most qualified to make. He most amply illustrates this in the life of Winston Churchill who constantly pushed for technologies, actions and strategies the generals didn’t want. Many—most?—of his senior generals were quite critical of him as a wartime leader in their memoirs, though history is much kinder to Churchill than those who sniped at him.
Finally, the author makes the excellent observation that very senior generals, though we like to think of them as wizened and deeply experienced in their craft, are in fact novices at fighting massive forces at senior levels. This is nearly universally true: each major war may have senior generals who served as Captains and Lieutenants in a previous war or wars, but who have never been in the cauldron of senior command, its unique stresses and connections to political aims and constraints, and thus should not necessarily be deferred to in judgment on those issues. Nor should we be surprised that some—perhaps many—will ill-perform or fail at those levels so a need to replace them should likewise be unsurprising. I saw this first-hand, even without the stress of battle: success at lower ranks is a very imperfect predictor of success at higher ranks even in a peacetime military.
There is much here with which a professional soldier will disagree. But every one who aspires to high military leadership ought to read and understand this book, as should their supreme commanders.
His methodology is old-school, but necessary for such an undertaking. He examines the subject by studying four cases he considers models—in different ways—of a political leader directing his warriors well: the American President Lincoln and his generals, Clemenceau and the French Generals of World War I, Churchill and his generals (and coalition) in World War II, and David Ben-Gurion with his unruly new military in Israel’s war for independence. Though each person and situation was quite different, each was instructive, in the author’s view, of how a political leader should lead in wartime.
Among the many intriguing observations, these three most interested me: He has quite a different take on Lincoln than most Lincoln biographers. The popular notion is an inexperienced and impatient Lincoln trying out general after general until he found one (Grant) who shared his impatience. To Cohen, the situation was quite the opposite: he saw Lincoln as a master politician who understood what was needed politically from the prosecution of the war, and was served by a string of generals who, unable to make that intellectual connection, never did live up to the political requirements of waging war.
He also challenges the common notion, almost a tenet of faith in today’s military—that a political leader should lay out the broad political objectives of the war, then let the professional soldier figure out how to get it done without political interference. He challenges this notion with the idea that many details of a war, sometimes even small details, have significant political calculations and impacts that Presidents and Prime Ministers, not generals, are most qualified to make. He most amply illustrates this in the life of Winston Churchill who constantly pushed for technologies, actions and strategies the generals didn’t want. Many—most?—of his senior generals were quite critical of him as a wartime leader in their memoirs, though history is much kinder to Churchill than those who sniped at him.
Finally, the author makes the excellent observation that very senior generals, though we like to think of them as wizened and deeply experienced in their craft, are in fact novices at fighting massive forces at senior levels. This is nearly universally true: each major war may have senior generals who served as Captains and Lieutenants in a previous war or wars, but who have never been in the cauldron of senior command, its unique stresses and connections to political aims and constraints, and thus should not necessarily be deferred to in judgment on those issues. Nor should we be surprised that some—perhaps many—will ill-perform or fail at those levels so a need to replace them should likewise be unsurprising. I saw this first-hand, even without the stress of battle: success at lower ranks is a very imperfect predictor of success at higher ranks even in a peacetime military.
There is much here with which a professional soldier will disagree. But every one who aspires to high military leadership ought to read and understand this book, as should their supreme commanders.
February 8, 2018
In 2002, a professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies released an oft discussed work on civil-military relations. Eliot Cohen’s Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime is a review of noteworthy case studies of four highly regarded statesmen as they led through conflict. Cohen is an American political scientist who received his B.A. in government and PhD in Political 카지노싸이트 from Harvard University. He served as counselor to the US State Department from 2007-2009 and currently as the Director of the Strategic Studies Program at Johns Hopkins Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. This work intends to contribute to the fields of political science and particularly civil-military relations in which Dr. Cohen is widely published in both fields.
Cohen’s thesis is compelling in that even as he cites Huntington’s The Soldier and the State in a discussion of the “normal” theory of civilian-military relations, he also uses four extraordinary case studies to reinforce the claim of Clemenceau that “war is too important to leave to the generals.” The framework used by the author begins by discussing that the primary concern within the US civilian-military relationship is not a military takeover of the state. Conversely, it is finding the proper balance of a military strong enough to serve as a serious deterrent to potential adversaries while not being strong enough or desiring to take over the state. In the “normal” theory of civil-military relations, the most effective form of civilian control of the military is that which isolates military members from politics but gives unfettered ability in military matters. In Supreme Command, Cohen examines this theory from the perspective of four senior statesmen which led their constituencies through some form of conflict. Using the leadership of Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion to build his argument, Cohen argues that active statesmen make the best wartime leaders, pushing their military subordinates to succeed where they might have failed if left to their own devices.
There were several key strengths and weaknesses to Supreme Command. One strength is that it reveals that the “rules” of civil-military affairs are not unbreakable. In fact, the civilian leaders selected were far more intrusive, albeit successful, than they should have been in a “normal” leadership relationship. A key weakness is that not all civilian leaders are the caliber of those in this book. In fact, many civilian leaders will fail to comprehend the strategies of this book. Resultantly, it would have helped to include a case study discussing a statesman which is not lionized somewhere. Cohen attempts to remedy this concern in the “Leadership Without Genius” chapter, but this seems more of an afterthought than valid review.
Supreme Command is interesting due to the nature of the chosen subjects and should be used by students of political science and civilian-military relations. However, its failure to include a less-canonized example of a civilian leader leaves the reader wondering if the chosen case studies are more the exception or the rule.
Cohen’s thesis is compelling in that even as he cites Huntington’s The Soldier and the State in a discussion of the “normal” theory of civilian-military relations, he also uses four extraordinary case studies to reinforce the claim of Clemenceau that “war is too important to leave to the generals.” The framework used by the author begins by discussing that the primary concern within the US civilian-military relationship is not a military takeover of the state. Conversely, it is finding the proper balance of a military strong enough to serve as a serious deterrent to potential adversaries while not being strong enough or desiring to take over the state. In the “normal” theory of civil-military relations, the most effective form of civilian control of the military is that which isolates military members from politics but gives unfettered ability in military matters. In Supreme Command, Cohen examines this theory from the perspective of four senior statesmen which led their constituencies through some form of conflict. Using the leadership of Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion to build his argument, Cohen argues that active statesmen make the best wartime leaders, pushing their military subordinates to succeed where they might have failed if left to their own devices.
There were several key strengths and weaknesses to Supreme Command. One strength is that it reveals that the “rules” of civil-military affairs are not unbreakable. In fact, the civilian leaders selected were far more intrusive, albeit successful, than they should have been in a “normal” leadership relationship. A key weakness is that not all civilian leaders are the caliber of those in this book. In fact, many civilian leaders will fail to comprehend the strategies of this book. Resultantly, it would have helped to include a case study discussing a statesman which is not lionized somewhere. Cohen attempts to remedy this concern in the “Leadership Without Genius” chapter, but this seems more of an afterthought than valid review.
Supreme Command is interesting due to the nature of the chosen subjects and should be used by students of political science and civilian-military relations. However, its failure to include a less-canonized example of a civilian leader leaves the reader wondering if the chosen case studies are more the exception or the rule.
June 11, 2023
أولًا نتطرق لفصول الكتاب السبعة🔎
الفصل الأول الجندي ورجل الدولة:يبدأ هذه الفصل بمناقشة العلاقات بين المدنيين والعسكريين من وجهة نظر عامة
الفصل الثاني لنكون يبعث برسالة:هو الرئيس السادس عشر الزعيم العظيم الذي واجه فترة صعب ألا وهي الحرب الأهلية، كان المؤلف ذكي وهو يحلل شخصية لنكون سياسيًا ونفسيًا من خلال رسائله ليخرج لنا وجه الحقيقي
الفصل الثالث كليمنصو في زيارة:اشتهر وزير دفاع فرنسا في وقت الحرب العظمى لأنه يرى أنه لايجوز ان تترك الحرب للعسكريين وسيذهب الكاتب لصدامه مع فوش وبيتان وكذالك حجته بأنه الحرب تبدأ لأسباب سياسية وتنتهي لأسباب سياسية
الفصل الرابع تشرشل يطرح سؤالا:هذه الرجل يصنف بأنه أعظم قائد في القرن العشرين، سنتعرف على تشرشل وهو صاحب روح الحماسة والمقاومة حتى النصر،ورغبته في ضبط قادته الذين لايتفقون معه
الفصل الخامس بن غورين:الشخصية الرابعه والأخيرة أول رئيس للكيان المغتصب السفاح الذي أرتكب مجازر بحق الشعب الفلسطيني المؤمن بتطهير الشعب الفلسطيني،يتناول هذه الكتاب بجزء أكبر العلاقة بين المدنيين والعسكريين المتمثلة في صراع المجرم مع المنظمات الارهابية الصهيونية وكيف أستطاع حلها جميعًا وضمها للجيش
الفصل السادس قيادة بلا عبقرية: يستعرض المؤلف العلاقة بين المدنيين والعسكريين بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية في النظر في كيفية خوض الأمريكان لحرب فيتنام في وجود قادة مثل (جونسون وماكنمارا)
الفصل السابع حوار غير متكافئ: وفي هذه الفصل محاولة للخروج بنتائج عامة للديمقراطيات المعاصرة ودارسي القيادة على العموم
الخاتمة حرب رامسفيلد:يقدم المؤلف رامسفيلد كنموذج للحوار غير المتكافئ بين المدنيين والعسكريين ينتج عنه نصر سريع،ويؤكد أن الحروب التي خاضتها الولايات المتحدة منذ فيتنام حتى رامسفيلد كانت كلها بأطار النظرية السائدة
الملحق نظرية سيطرة المدنيين: هنا يناقش المؤلف أستاذه هنتنجتون في الوصفة التي قدمها لضمان السيطرة المدنية على القوات المسلحة، ويشرح أن هنتنجتون كان يوافق على ضرورة الفصل بين دور المدني ودور العسكري، بل يؤكد على هذه الضرورة رأيي في الكتاب : الكتاب يتحدث عن العلاقة بين المدنيين والعسكريين على المستوى القيادة وتاريخها بشكل خاص وبشكل عام عن سمات القادة العظماء حسب وجهة نظر الكاتب هذه الكتاب مختلف تمامًا عن كتب السياسة الذي نعرفها ستعرف الكثير من الشخصيات وسترى القادة والساسة من وجه أخر ليس في أمور تافهة نفس الفضائح وأنما صعوبة وظيفتهم وقدرت بعضهم العجيبة في أدراك الأمور الكتاب يحتاج له تركيز لأنه تحليلي من الناحية التاريخية والسياسية ويوضح أنغماس السياسة في الشؤون العسكرية ستعيش حياة السياسي في زمن الحرب في بعض الفصول
الفصل الأول الجندي ورجل الدولة:يبدأ هذه الفصل بمناقشة العلاقات بين المدنيين والعسكريين من وجهة نظر عامة
الفصل الثاني لنكون يبعث برسالة:هو الرئيس السادس عشر الزعيم العظيم الذي واجه فترة صعب ألا وهي الحرب الأهلية، كان المؤلف ذكي وهو يحلل شخصية لنكون سياسيًا ونفسيًا من خلال رسائله ليخرج لنا وجه الحقيقي
الفصل الثالث كليمنصو في زيارة:اشتهر وزير دفاع فرنسا في وقت الحرب العظمى لأنه يرى أنه لايجوز ان تترك الحرب للعسكريين وسيذهب الكاتب لصدامه مع فوش وبيتان وكذالك حجته بأنه الحرب تبدأ لأسباب سياسية وتنتهي لأسباب سياسية
الفصل الرابع تشرشل يطرح سؤالا:هذه الرجل يصنف بأنه أعظم قائد في القرن العشرين، سنتعرف على تشرشل وهو صاحب روح الحماسة والمقاومة حتى النصر،ورغبته في ضبط قادته الذين لايتفقون معه
الفصل الخامس بن غورين:الشخصية الرابعه والأخيرة أول رئيس للكيان المغتصب السفاح الذي أرتكب مجازر بحق الشعب الفلسطيني المؤمن بتطهير الشعب الفلسطيني،يتناول هذه الكتاب بجزء أكبر العلاقة بين المدنيين والعسكريين المتمثلة في صراع المجرم مع المنظمات الارهابية الصهيونية وكيف أستطاع حلها جميعًا وضمها للجيش
الفصل السادس قيادة بلا عبقرية: يستعرض المؤلف العلاقة بين المدنيين والعسكريين بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية في النظر في كيفية خوض الأمريكان لحرب فيتنام في وجود قادة مثل (جونسون وماكنمارا)
الفصل السابع حوار غير متكافئ: وفي هذه الفصل محاولة للخروج بنتائج عامة للديمقراطيات المعاصرة ودارسي القيادة على العموم
الخاتمة حرب رامسفيلد:يقدم المؤلف رامسفيلد كنموذج للحوار غير المتكافئ بين المدنيين والعسكريين ينتج عنه نصر سريع،ويؤكد أن الحروب التي خاضتها الولايات المتحدة منذ فيتنام حتى رامسفيلد كانت كلها بأطار النظرية السائدة
الملحق نظرية سيطرة المدنيين: هنا يناقش المؤلف أستاذه هنتنجتون في الوصفة التي قدمها لضمان السيطرة المدنية على القوات المسلحة، ويشرح أن هنتنجتون كان يوافق على ضرورة الفصل بين دور المدني ودور العسكري، بل يؤكد على هذه الضرورة رأيي في الكتاب : الكتاب يتحدث عن العلاقة بين المدنيين والعسكريين على المستوى القيادة وتاريخها بشكل خاص وبشكل عام عن سمات القادة العظماء حسب وجهة نظر الكاتب هذه الكتاب مختلف تمامًا عن كتب السياسة الذي نعرفها ستعرف الكثير من الشخصيات وسترى القادة والساسة من وجه أخر ليس في أمور تافهة نفس الفضائح وأنما صعوبة وظيفتهم وقدرت بعضهم العجيبة في أدراك الأمور الكتاب يحتاج له تركيز لأنه تحليلي من الناحية التاريخية والسياسية ويوضح أنغماس السياسة في الشؤون العسكرية ستعيش حياة السياسي في زمن الحرب في بعض الفصول
January 27, 2020
Cohen provides an exceptional account of civil-military relations in his review of the wartime command of Lincoln, Clemenceu, Churchill, and Ben-Gurion. Cohen effectively shows how effective civilian commanders of national military forces make it a point to educate themselves on military operations and in exercising the responsibilities of command. Military failure comes when civilian oversight fails to hold the military accountable when it fails to achieve operational goals in support of the ultimate political objectives.
Although this book was published in 2002, Cohen offers much to think about regarding current civil-military relations. With the US's preference for conducting small-scale military operations against terrorists and operations against countries like China and Russia designed to deter militarization, what responsibility does the President have to know in great detail what his theater commanders are up to? The Obama Administration's "Pivot to the Pacific" was certainly an admirable example of an attempt to coordinate military operations with diplomatic and economic initiatives, but it is hard to think of other attempts where senior civilian leaders have lived up to the examples in this book.
It would be interesting to apply Cohen's model to countries like Russia or China, where Putin and Xi seem to be having greater success in achieving their political objectives to disrupt the US, both domestically and internationally.
The most striking thing about Cohen's narrative is the absence of, in my experience, of his insights in training military officers. Having been through half a career's worth of training, there are few opportunities for lessons on civil-military relations, let alone discussions with the insight of a scholar like Cohen. This may be because officers are not likely to work with civilians until the second half of their career, but the lack of such discussion betrays a shortsightedness and a lack of confidence in junior officers to grasp complex arguments.
Although this book was published in 2002, Cohen offers much to think about regarding current civil-military relations. With the US's preference for conducting small-scale military operations against terrorists and operations against countries like China and Russia designed to deter militarization, what responsibility does the President have to know in great detail what his theater commanders are up to? The Obama Administration's "Pivot to the Pacific" was certainly an admirable example of an attempt to coordinate military operations with diplomatic and economic initiatives, but it is hard to think of other attempts where senior civilian leaders have lived up to the examples in this book.
It would be interesting to apply Cohen's model to countries like Russia or China, where Putin and Xi seem to be having greater success in achieving their political objectives to disrupt the US, both domestically and internationally.
The most striking thing about Cohen's narrative is the absence of, in my experience, of his insights in training military officers. Having been through half a career's worth of training, there are few opportunities for lessons on civil-military relations, let alone discussions with the insight of a scholar like Cohen. This may be because officers are not likely to work with civilians until the second half of their career, but the lack of such discussion betrays a shortsightedness and a lack of confidence in junior officers to grasp complex arguments.
October 29, 2017
Cohen is a wonderful writer, capable of distilling a great deal of information into a relatively small book -- without trivializing the subject. To be honest though, I think I need to give the last 1/3 of the book another read. For not all of us are wired to be the kind of incredible leaders that Churchill, Lincoln, Ben-Gurion, and Clemenceau were in their respective times. And in the absence of great statesmen, it's up to the rest of us to sort out how to best navigate the civil-military relationship.
In the last 1/3 of this book, Cohen talks a lot about leadership by a number of leaders, almost none of whom were particularly great. I almost feel like it's worth doubling back to re-capture the lessons of those who didn't get it right so that I can glean what not to do, rather than concentrate heavily on emulating the achievements of the four gents listed above.
This is good reading. It ought to be required reading today in high schools or colleges across the country, if only to stimulate the idea in peoples' minds about just how important it is for citizens in a democracy understand their politicians, their military, and the way those two interact with one another. If the idea sparks a debate, perhaps the debate will spark a more sober opinion than typically comes across from both the right and the left political arcs.
In the last 1/3 of this book, Cohen talks a lot about leadership by a number of leaders, almost none of whom were particularly great. I almost feel like it's worth doubling back to re-capture the lessons of those who didn't get it right so that I can glean what not to do, rather than concentrate heavily on emulating the achievements of the four gents listed above.
This is good reading. It ought to be required reading today in high schools or colleges across the country, if only to stimulate the idea in peoples' minds about just how important it is for citizens in a democracy understand their politicians, their military, and the way those two interact with one another. If the idea sparks a debate, perhaps the debate will spark a more sober opinion than typically comes across from both the right and the left political arcs.
April 20, 2019
Invaluable Integrative primer for bewildered students
Highly recommended. My education as a social science researcher and extensive exposure to classics, political science and history was of little help in understanding warfare. Polybius, de Saxe, Xenophon, Clausewitz, peninsular war, naval history, phalanx, legions and horse culture, Keegan, VDH are all fascinating. This book, however, coherently interprets a carefully chosen selection of historical records which spans 2000 years. Excellent presentation for an amateur reader, one who sincerely struggles to comprehend what war is and how one can possibly go about engaging in it.
Not that I deny the need to defend ones homeland. Perhaps, as a female, a low testosterone person , is a factor which impedes one’s ability to envision attacking, hurting i.e. combat. If called, I will force myself to be stalwart, to be as calculating, objective and skillful a leader as I can,
History is plain, without preparation , we will be defenseless against the inevitable of human aggression . We have a constant duty to steel ourselves as staunch & responsible guardians of our homeland and culture, I appreciate your writing this book. 💙Ann.
Highly recommended. My education as a social science researcher and extensive exposure to classics, political science and history was of little help in understanding warfare. Polybius, de Saxe, Xenophon, Clausewitz, peninsular war, naval history, phalanx, legions and horse culture, Keegan, VDH are all fascinating. This book, however, coherently interprets a carefully chosen selection of historical records which spans 2000 years. Excellent presentation for an amateur reader, one who sincerely struggles to comprehend what war is and how one can possibly go about engaging in it.
Not that I deny the need to defend ones homeland. Perhaps, as a female, a low testosterone person , is a factor which impedes one’s ability to envision attacking, hurting i.e. combat. If called, I will force myself to be stalwart, to be as calculating, objective and skillful a leader as I can,
History is plain, without preparation , we will be defenseless against the inevitable of human aggression . We have a constant duty to steel ourselves as staunch & responsible guardians of our homeland and culture, I appreciate your writing this book. 💙Ann.
March 2, 2020
Eliot Cohen provides a look at four war statesmen: Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, & Ben-Gurion.
Overall, a very interesting read with pol-mil relations today as they are, many saying they changed, but Dr. Cohen provides a picture they are very much the same.
Using those four leaders he compares Vietnam and the Gulf War with increased power given to the CJCS, and wartime powers increasing (think COCOM’s) since the days of Lincoln.
One of my favorite quotes: “Serving as the catspaw of rival politicians or merely riding on the crest of fame, deserved or otherwise, a retired general can exercise considerable political influence, particularly once freed from the constraints imposed by active service.” (Very applicable, especially today, written in 2002).
I always enjoy Dr. Cohen’s work. His points of view enlarge my own perspective and challenge my beliefs resulting in an appreciation to challenge what I once held as a fact or truth.
Any military officer can glean historic reflection and a reminder that however the pol-mil landscape shifts, very much of it will remain as it always has.
Overall, a very interesting read with pol-mil relations today as they are, many saying they changed, but Dr. Cohen provides a picture they are very much the same.
Using those four leaders he compares Vietnam and the Gulf War with increased power given to the CJCS, and wartime powers increasing (think COCOM’s) since the days of Lincoln.
One of my favorite quotes: “Serving as the catspaw of rival politicians or merely riding on the crest of fame, deserved or otherwise, a retired general can exercise considerable political influence, particularly once freed from the constraints imposed by active service.” (Very applicable, especially today, written in 2002).
I always enjoy Dr. Cohen’s work. His points of view enlarge my own perspective and challenge my beliefs resulting in an appreciation to challenge what I once held as a fact or truth.
Any military officer can glean historic reflection and a reminder that however the pol-mil landscape shifts, very much of it will remain as it always has.
September 6, 2019
Full disclaimer: I listened to the audiobook. Supreme Command is an interesting book in that it looks at what makes a good leader during times of war. The author gives 4 different examples of leaders of countries during war time that he feels best encapsulates good leadership. Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion all had to deal with different obstacles/decisions that would heavily affect their nations future. Within all this however, the focus is on their interactions with their military counterparts. Each one dealt with them differently, whether it was Abraham Lincoln's mild mannered demeanor, Clemenceau's steadfastness in the face of foreign opposition to the direction of WW1, Churchill's meticulous and bullish rapport with his generals, or Ben-Gurion's conviction to incorporate a more professional military to carve out an independent Jewish state.
As someone who majored in history, I found the book interesting. I am not sure someone who is not a fan of history, specifically military history, would appreciate the book as much.
As someone who majored in history, I found the book interesting. I am not sure someone who is not a fan of history, specifically military history, would appreciate the book as much.
February 11, 2018
To often we think of the wartime generals. Sometimes we should look at the political figureheads as well. This book does just that. Churchill, Lincoln, Clemenceau, and Ben Gurion. Some with combat experience. Some without. These leaders each have had numerous texts devoted to themselves, some I have already read. Some are on my never ending list. Each of these leaders directed their wars. Sometimes they relieved generals that would not envision their strategy. They tolerated disagreements with their wartime direction as long as the disagreements were from competent wartime leaders.
A refreshing look at the politico-military leadership of a diverse set of great national leaders in their times of peril.
A refreshing look at the politico-military leadership of a diverse set of great national leaders in their times of peril.
September 24, 2022
A well done dive into 4 major statesman (Lincoln, Clemanceau, Churchill, Ben Gurion) involved in some of the most bloody and complex conflicts in the last 200 years, and their characteristics as to what possibly made them successful. A little more complex than the average thinking about "Lincoln kept firing generals until he could find someone that would fight." They were all brilliant, thoughtful, tireless, willing to question, pushed their generals (never as tyrant). Also, a lens on the civil-military relationship in some of the more recent U.S. conflicts (Persian Gulf War I, Former Yugoslavia, and Mogadishu).
January 5, 2018
Was a very good read, case studies on Churchill and David Ben Guerion were highly informative. Important that statesmen equip themselves with the knowledge and skill required to effectively and productively challenge senior leadership. They need to have an understanding of National Geopolitics, history, an understanding of all elements of national power and sufficient military technical knowledge to at least have a start point for discussions n with senior leadership. Most important in all of this is a regular and informed dialogue between statesmen and miltRy leader.
August 11, 2021
الكتاب يحاول الإجابة عن السؤال التالي: في وقت الحرب، إلى أي حد ينبغي للقيادة المدنية التدخل في الشؤون العسكرية؟
الإجابة باختصار لا ينبغي لرجال الدولة ترك مسؤولية الحرب للقادة باعتبار الكفاءة الفنية ويجب متابعة الحرب عن كثب بالمشاركة الجادة في استراتيجية الحرب سواء بالوضع أو التعديل، وفي الوقت نفسه يحذر من التدخل المفرط لمستوى التفصيلات البسيطة قليلة الأهمية في اتخاذ القرار والتي لن تؤدي إلا لزيادة سخط العسكريين بلا فائدة تذكر.
لم يعجبني وضعه بن جوريون كمثال على كفاءة رجل الدولة في توجيه الحرب ومبالغته في رسم دوره جعلني أشك في كثير من الحجج التاريخية التي قدمها خلال مناقشته للقادة الآخرين.
الإجابة باختصار لا ينبغي لرجال الدولة ترك مسؤولية الحرب للقادة باعتبار الكفاءة الفنية ويجب متابعة الحرب عن كثب بالمشاركة الجادة في استراتيجية الحرب سواء بالوضع أو التعديل، وفي الوقت نفسه يحذر من التدخل المفرط لمستوى التفصيلات البسيطة قليلة الأهمية في اتخاذ القرار والتي لن تؤدي إلا لزيادة سخط العسكريين بلا فائدة تذكر.
لم يعجبني وضعه بن جوريون كمثال على كفاءة رجل الدولة في توجيه الحرب ومبالغته في رسم دوره جعلني أشك في كثير من الحجج التاريخية التي قدمها خلال مناقشته للقادة الآخرين.
December 17, 2019
الكتاب يتحدث عن العلاقة بين المدنيين والعسكريين على المستوى القيادة وتاريخها بشكل خاص وبشكل عام عن سمات القادة العظماء حسب وجهة نظر الكاتب،
ويناقش النظريات العسكرية المعروفة وابرز اوجه النقد عليها
بالاستناد الى تجارب عملية في التاريخ
في الكتاب معلومات كثيرة ومثيرة قد تعطيك وجهات نظر جديدة تفسر احداث وصراعات عشتها وتعيشها او تراها الان
اجد هذا الكتاب إضافة مميزة لحصيلة القراءت السياسية لاي قارئ في هذا المجال
ويناقش النظريات العسكرية المعروفة وابرز اوجه النقد عليها
بالاستناد الى تجارب عملية في التاريخ
في الكتاب معلومات كثيرة ومثيرة قد تعطيك وجهات نظر جديدة تفسر احداث وصراعات عشتها وتعيشها او تراها الان
اجد هذا الكتاب إضافة مميزة لحصيلة القراءت السياسية لاي قارئ في هذا المجال
March 23, 2022
I'm blown away, not by the premise of the book, that great statesmanship requires the statesperson in question to maintain their grip on the strategic and, sometimes, technical aspects of a war, but by the fact this was written in 2002 right after the invasion of Afghanistan and before the invasion of Iraq by a person who was actually in the Bush cabinet. And somehow the lessons of the book seem to have been completely missed in the Wars on Terror.
October 22, 2023
Provides examples of successful civilian leadership during times of war using historical examples of Lincoln, Churchill, Clemenceau, and Ben-Gurion. It deals with the civilian and military relationship on how national strategic policy interacts with military strategy and argues that civilian leadership needs to be diligently supervised by the military. Policy and war influence each other, yet we try to isolate the two by setting a strategic goal and leaving it for the military to achieve.
November 27, 2020
I thought the contents were fairly well structured. The 4 chosen leaders have been proven by time and history to have been successful.
My rating comes from the fact that the book seemed as if it was written by a college sophomore. Needless words, lots of clauses that could be eliminated.
My rating comes from the fact that the book seemed as if it was written by a college sophomore. Needless words, lots of clauses that could be eliminated.
August 6, 2022
Interesting concept for a book, and was an interesting read, but I felt this book was too long and contained too much filler. This book could easily be a 10-20 page scholarly article and would still get the point across.
April 24, 2024
Presently surprised in the second half of the book that looks at the dynamic of civil and military balance that happens in and out of war. I picked it up expecting a readers' digest of 4 great leaders and took away a new appreciation for the military officer corps
February 5, 2019
required US Army War College book, Fantastic read
January 23, 2020
Reading this book is worth it because Cohen has a firm grasp of the interaction between military and civilian leadership. The section bout Winston Churchill alone makes it a worthwhile read.
November 21, 2021
Great book on civ mil relations for any IR/security studies people out there. Fascinating case studies that really make it a joyful read.
March 15, 2022
Must read on political and strategic leadership in civil military relations. Based on four strong case studies. The conclusions still stand and can be applied to different contexts.
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